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NOTES
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
PERSONHOOD: FACT OR FICTION?
The United States Constitution "has stood the test of over
two hundred years [and has] preserved and protected our basic
rights and liberties."' The interpretation of this governing
document must be limited to ensure uniformity of law and
equality of rights.2 Such limitation becomes crucial, particularly
when considering the social, moral, religious, political, and eco-
nomic evolution of our country since the drafting of the Consti-
tution.' The United States Supreme Court, and the judicial
branch in general, have nevertheless created legal fictions to af-
ford select groups constitutional rights that neither the Consti-
tution nor the amendments thereto specifically guarantee.4
' Robert Dole, The Constitution and the Congress, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 120 (1995). Some posit that "our" should include "real"
people rather than entities such as the corporation. See Corporations are Not Per-
sons, 134 CONG. REC. E1385 (Hon. Bruce Morrison inserting into the record an op-
ed piece written by Ralph Nader and Carl J. Mayer, originally published in THE
WASHINGTON POST on April 9, 1988).
2 Cf. Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views on Abortion, "The 25th Anniversary of Roe
v. Wade: Has it Stood the Test of Time": Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution, Federalism, and Property Rights, Jan. 21, 1998, [hereinafter Roe v. Wade
Anniversary Views] (testimony of Gerard V. Bradley) (characterizing Justice White's
dissent in Roe v. Wade and stating that the decision was "well outside the bounds of
proper constitutional adjudication"). But see Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Consti-
tution: Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is? 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 9, 53 (1995) (examining Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955), and lamenting that the Court did not "attack the dragon [of segregation]
with zeal, once they decided that the intent of the Framers... was either irrelevant
or inconclusive").
3 See Thomas P. O'Neill, What the Constitution Means to Us Today, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 1, at 117
(elaborating on the expansion of our country from a weak union of four million
members to a reigning "world superpower" 243 million members strong).
4 See generally Tejshree Thapa, Note, Expounding on the Constitution: Legal
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Part I of this Note will explore the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part II will examine the concept of the
legal fiction and the Court's employment of it to grant rights to
groups and entities that are not explicitly granted rights under
the United States Constitution. Parts III to VII will address
corporate and fetal life, provide an overview of the judicial
treatment of such lives, and consider the greater concept of life
by examining the lack of constitutional protection in the fetal
abortion context. Analogies will be drawn between the fetus and
the human being, comparing this relationship with that between
the corporation and the human being.
This Note does not attempt to argue that the corporate en-
tity should be denied constitutional personhood. Likewise, it
does not purport to address the right to choose an abortion,
abortions in the context of rape and incest, nor when the
mother's health is in jeopardy. The dilemmas raised by abortion
are indeed personal and appropriate for another forum. This pa-
per does address the blatantly illogical reality of including a cor-
poration in the definition of personhood and granting it expan-
sive rights while denying a fetus the same treatment. At a
minimum, the fetus is due, and must be granted, the same con-
stitutional protections as the corporation.
I. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION
Various interpretations exist for the true purpose of the
original enactment of the Civil Rights Amendments and the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 It is widely accepted that the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to be "a civil rights amend-
ment,"6 designed to safeguard newly emancipated blacks from
Fictions and the Ninth Amendment, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 147-50 (1992)
(describing various constitutional legal fictions).
5 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). See generally Bret Boyce, Original-
ism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 967-1002 (1998)
(chronicling the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and discussing the origi-
nal meaning of its Privileges and Immunities Clause).
6 The "slavery amendments," namely the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, are considered the "most important expansion of civil rights in the United
States." Civil Rights and Discrimination (visited Feb. 15, 1999)<http://www.
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unfair governmental treatment.7 Adopted in 1868, the Four-
teenth Amendment was enacted to give Congress the power to
counter the "black codes" established following the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment-codes aimed at limiting the civil rights
of the newly emancipated black slaves.8 Not coincidentally, the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted the year following the
culmination of the Civil War "to prevent the South from terroriz-
ing and tyrannizing the new freedmen and the white unionists
who had opposed secession in several Southern states."9
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has
served as a medium for creating rights not guaranteed by the
text of the Constitution.0 As a result, we have witnessed the ex-
pansion of the umbrella of constitutional protection to cover
groups never originally intended to be guaranteed protection."
Reflecting this notion, the intent to empower or personify the
corporation cannot be found anywhere in the original adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' Corporations, notwithstanding
nylawchristopher.com/Discrimination.html>.
7 See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1; Bittker, supra note 2, at 10.8 See Civil Rights and Discrimination, supra note 6 (visited Feb. 15, 1999).
Does the 14th Amendment Apply to the Second? (visited Oct. 29, 1998)
<htt'J/www.arcrafts.com/think/LegaVKATES/dk002.html>.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 39 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997) (explaining that the Court has "smuggle[d
in] new rights... under the Due Process Clause (which... is textually incapable of
containing them)").
" See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 169-70, 329-30 (1989) (positing that the original understanding of the
Constitution did not include modern privacy rights and rights against sex discrimi-
nation); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-
1869, at 109-13 (1990) (suggesting that originally the Fourteenth Amendment was
not understood to require the integration of schools or to give blacks the right to
vote).
,2 See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 578 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas explained that there was "no suggestion in [the] sub-
mission [of the Fourteenth Amendment to the people] that it was designed to put
negroes and corporations into one class and so dilute the police power of the States
over corporate affairs and quoted Arthur Twining Hadley's position that:
The Fourteenth Amendment was framed to protect the negroes from op-
pression by the whites, not to protect corporations from oppression by the
legislature. It is doubtful whether a single one of the members of a Con-
gress who voted for it had any idea that it would touch the question of cor-
porate regulation at all.
Id, (sources omitted); Ralph Nader and Carl J. Mayer, Court Doctrine Thwarts Re-
form, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., May 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 4897693
(explaining that no explicit statement by the Framers can be found illustrating an
intent to include corporations in the definition of "person" of the Fourteenth
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that reality, have long used the Fourteenth Amendment as a
weapon to secure rights." Even more ironic is that "of the cases
in [the Supreme] Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment
was applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less
than one-half of one per cent [had] invoked it in protection of the
negro race."' This irony is particularly noteworthy as the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment was completely void of an in-
tent to include corporations within the scope of constitutional
protection."
II. LEGAL FICTIONS
The legal fiction is a tool employed by the courts to create
rights and is used both for convenience and to serve the ends of
justice. 6 This is particularly troublesome when one considers
that the judicial branch, which is to interpret laws 7 and which
was originally described as "the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution"8 and the "weakest"19 branch, has come
to be described as "an important legal and political institution."0
Amendment).
's See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 589 (1990) ("Once armed with the fourteenth amend-
ment, corporations wielded it with considerable force [as] 'more than 50 per cent.
asked that its benefits be extended to corporations.'") (citing Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting)).
14 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 90 (citing CHARLES WALLACE
COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 138 (1912)).
'" See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 85-86 ("Neither the history nor
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment justifies the belief that corporations are
included within its protection."); Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1; see
also Hodding Carter III, Viewpoint, Court Packing: Tradition of Both Left and
Right, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1986 (opining that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court to include "corporations" within the Fourteenth Amendment defini-
tion of "person" was primarily an effort to" 'safeguard' property").
16 See I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND
ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 9 (1927).
17 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts.") (emphasis added).
18 Id. at 465.
1 Id. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 167 (J.V. Prichard,
ed. & Thomas Nugent, trans. 1914) ("Of the three powers ... , the judiciary... is
next to nothing.") (emphasis added).
20 THOMAS G. WALKER & LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 21-22 (1993) (explaining that the Court often engages in
decision making that not only has social effects but is indicative of current political
trends).
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Employing various tools including the legal fiction, the judiciary
is now creating laws, a function that it is performing in a dan-
gerous and alarming manner.2' The courts, which are now
seemingly completely unchecked, have created justifications to
rationalize this behavior.' It is posited that, "judicial lawmaking
is part of the very constitution of American democracy, albeit an
extremely controversial part." 23 The Court has manipulated the
Constitution and "use[d]... constitutional text as a springboard
for announcing new rights not expressly mentioned in the text."'
21 See William J. Bennett, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY: THE JUDICIAL
USURPATION OF POLITICS 65-66 (Mitchell S. Muncy, ed., 1997) ("[C]ourts are acting
in remarkably inappropriate and injurious ways."). Perhaps the lack of oversight of
such action is due to the gradual nature of the judiciary's self-determined evolution.
See Mary Ann Glendon, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 113-14
(referring to Tocqueville and stating that "Tyranny... need not announce itself with
trumpets. It may come softly-so softly that we will barely notice when we become
one of those countries where there are no citizens but only subjects.").
2See generally Steven Frias, Note, Power to the People: How the Supreme Court
Has Reviewed Legislation Enacted Through Direct Democracy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 721, 725 (1998) (discussing judicial activism and judicial legislating).
2Amy Gutmann, Preface to A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at ix
(explaining the underestimation of the role of judicial lawmaking). This theory has
been referred to as the nonoriginalist theory. See T.R. VAN GEEL, UNDERSTANDING
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 52 (2d ed. 1997). In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110 (1989), Supreme Court Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, demonstrated
his alignment with the nonoriginalist viewpoint when he wrote,
In construing the Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to those in-
terests specifically protected by historical practice.., the plurality ignores
the kind of society in which our Constitution exists ... [The Constitution is
a] living charter[,] it is [not] a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 408 (1819) (stating that the Constitution
must evolve with changing times and circumstances in order to survive); VAN GEEL,
supra at 52 (explaining the view that the Constitution must "be adaptable to new
circumstances, to new problems, to new moral ideas"); SCALIA, supra note 10, at 6
(stating that common-law courts had two functions: "to apply the law to the facts
[and] the more important one ... to make the law").24 VAN GEEL, supra note 23, at 54. Such rights have included the right of pri-
vacy, which, in turn, has translated into a right to use contraceptives, see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the right to be informed of an entitlement
to counsel and a right to remain silent upon arrest, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). There have been warnings against the inherent contradictions of a de-
mocracy in which the non-representative and insulated judicial branch oversees the
elected branches of government and creates its own laws. See United States v. Rich-
ardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). "[Wihen the Supreme
Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected execu-
tive, it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people.., it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it." ALEXANDER M.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS
Constitutional personhood has been defined to include natu-
ral persons' and constitutional persons," which presumably in-
cludes those "juridical persons" upon whom the Court has felt it
appropriate to grant constitutional rights.' Query whether a
"constitutional person" includes only the "unnatural." Judicial
and statutory definitions of "person" ' over the years have come
to include a variety of entities and characters, including the
"natural"-human aliens, 9  illegitimate children,30  and mi-
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-17 (1962). As a result, the people of the country become governed no
longer by the United States Constitution but by an elite few governing the masses,
resulting in a return to the days of narrow-minded nobility.
The gravity of a Supreme Court which sits as ruler and dictator was discussed
by Abraham Lincoln in his first inaugural address:
[Tihe candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon
vital questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by de-
cisions of the Supreme Court the instant they are made, in ordinary litiga-
tion between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be
their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their govern-
ment into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 579, 585-86 (Roy P. Basler ed., World Publishing
1969) (1946) (emphasis added); see also ROBERT L. MACEY, OUR AMERICAN LE-
VIATHAN UNBOUND: THE JUDICIAL PERVERSION OF AMERICAN FREEDOM xiii (1974)
(asserting that it is the responsibility of the American people to inspect, analyze,
and challenge Supreme Court decisions to ensure the sanctity of the Constitution).
25 See Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional
Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Spe-
cies, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445 (1992) (defining a "natural person" as a "biological
being).
See id. at 1446-47 (defining a "constitutional person" as "one who is protected
by the Constitution of the United States; in other words.., one who is granted con-
stitutional rights") (footnote omitted).
27 See id. at 1445 (describing the judicial inclusion of artificial beings in the
definition of personhood). "Juridical persons are legal constructs, such as corpora-
tions." Id.
28 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990) ("In general us-
age, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute term may include labor
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trus-
tees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.") (citation omitted).
29 See Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 435 U.S.
29 (1978) (holding that aliens are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); C.D.R. Enter., Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F.
Supp. 1164, 1168 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977) (including resident
aliens within the scope of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process protections).
20 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (establishing the personhood of
illegitimate children under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
500 [73:495
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nors,3  as well as the "unnatural"--foreign governments,32 labor
unions,' nursing homes,' municipalities, and government
units." Some have gone so far as to consider the personhood of
artificial intelligence and computer programs.36
One example of a prevalent "unnatural" or "constitutional"
person is the corporation. The corporation as a person for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes was created through the use of the
judicial legal fiction.' Over the years, the personhood of a
"corporation" under the Fourteenth Amendment has become well
established.38 Though Supreme Court precedent clearly grants
the corporation Fourteenth Amendment personhood protections,
the issue has not been free from dispute or debate.39 It is con-
ment).
3' See In re Scott K, 595 P.2d 105, 108 (Cal. 1979) (concluding minors are
"persons" with rights under the United States Constitution).
"See Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396, 399 (11th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (holding that foreign governments that have general ac-
cess to sue in the court system are also entitled, as "persons," to initiate treble dam-
age suits for antitrust violations under the Clayton Act).
3Labor unions have been interpreted to be "persons" under the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act, see, e.g., Casey v. FTC, 578 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1978), as
well as under the Bankruptcy Code, see e.g., Highway & City Freight Drivers,
Dockmen & Helpers, Local Union No. 600 v. Gordon Transp. Inc., 576 F.2d 1285,
1287 (8th Cir. 1978).
2 See Deborah M. Naglak, Essay, Medicare/Medicaid Reimbursement Issues A
Provider's Perspective, 5 J.L. & HEALTH 79, 86 (noting that both nursing homes and
hospitals have been included within the definition of personhood).
See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (holding
that government officials are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); City of La-
fayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 397 (1978) (including cities, as
municipal utility operators, within the definition of a "person" under antitrust laws).
See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1231, 1255-80 (1992) (examining whether artificial intelligence should be
granted "the rights of constitutional personhood").
87 See WORMSER, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that the corporation "is a distinct
person.., by process of fiction" (emphasis added)).
See Will Pinkston, Delaware: The State in Which to Incorporate, TENNESSEAN,
Sept. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12845449 (defining a corporation as "a legal en-
tity chartered by a U.S. state or the federal government... [r]egarded by courts as
an artificial person").
29 See Rivard, supra note 25, at 1451-54 (describing the judicial decision under-
lying the precedent as "an important conclusion ... based on... little reasoning");
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 308-12, 328-75 (1990) (discussing the Supreme Court
precedent surrounding corporate personhood for Fourteenth Amendment purposes
and concluding that, under our modem economic system, existing legal theories of
corporate personhood are inadequate). See generally Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic:
The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
575 (1989) (detailing the arguments underlying the concept of corporate person-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tended that the Court's inclusion of the corporation within the
scope of personhood was a haphazard judicial declaration,"
based on various pressures and motives, rather than well-
reasoned constitutional interpretation.
In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,4
the Court declared that a corporation is protected by the same
rights as natural persons for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, thus eliminating any un-
certainty and providing an anticlimactic end to the debate.42
Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite3 stated:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to...
corporations. We are ... of [the] opinion that it does.4
Two years later, in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Mill-
ing Co. v. Pennsylvania,45 the Court reaffirmed corporate person-
hood under both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.46
Did the members of the Court exercise legal reasoning, un-
derstanding the purpose and conforming to the spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment? Chief Justice Waite was the very jus-
tice who stated that to deny women the right to vote was not a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,47 and authored opinions
which limited the protection of newly-emancipated slaves.4
hood).
40 See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1 (asserting that the Court
"simp ly decreed that corporations were persons").
4 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
42 See id. at 396.
43 Chief Justice Waite's term on the Court began with his appointment in 1874
and ended with his death in 1888. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 906 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
OXFORD].
44 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. Chief Justice Waite's statement was made prior
to oral argument in Santa Clara. See id. The parties' briefs had extensively argued
this point. See id. The actual opinion was written by Justice Harlan. See id. at 397.
125 U.S. 181 (1888).
See id. at 188-89.
47 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874); see also OXFORD, supra note 43,
at 906.
4 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (refusing to allow federal
intervention into various state actions that allegedly breached Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (upholding the dis-
missal of one of two indictments against Kentucky election inspectors for violating
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Justice William B. Woods,49 a member of the Court during the
time the Civil War Amendments were read in a constricted
manner," held a conservative view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. His desire to limit the power of the federal government
fueled his decisions and "played a significant role in helping to
limit the ability of the Fourteenth Amendment to act as a vehicle
to protect individual rights."5 Despite the articulated concerns
about the expansion of individual rights and attempts to limit
and constrict the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
has freely expanded corporate rights.
Although corporations are generally governed by state law,
52
nevertheless, "Itihe Court's various substantive due process and
freedom of contract decisions between 1890 and 1937 strength-
ened the hand of corporations in their dealings with employees,
unions, consumers, and state legislatures.5 3 The Court, despite
attempts to "eschew[] responsibility for the law of corporations
directly,"' has greatly affected the development and growth of
corporate rights.5
Despite the questionable circumstances surrounding its
evolution, the corporation now undoubtedly qualifies as a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Greater corporate constitu-
the Fifteenth Amendment by not allowing an otherwise qualified citizen of African
descent to vote); see also OXFORD, supra note 43, at 906.
49 Justice Woods was appointed to the Court in 1880 and remained a justice
until his death in 1887. See OXFORD, supra note 43, at 938.
6 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the application of the
Civil Rights Act provisions, which entitled all persons to full and equal enjoyment of
private accommodations, to the states was not authorized by the Civil War Amend-
ments and was therefore unconstitutional).6' OXFORD, supra note 43, at 938.
2 See OXFORD, supra note 43, at 198; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co.,
972 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating that the law of the state of incor-
poration will govern in matters of internal corporate governance); In re Schepps
Food Stores, Inc., 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (finding that state law
governs a director's duties to the corporation and its shareholders); Brown v. Kleen
Kut Manuf. Co., 714 P.2d 942, 945 (Kan 1986) (determining that the law of the
state in which a corporation was formed will govern corporate liability).
OXFORD, supra note 43, at 199. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (striking down minimum wage provisions); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) (allowing dismissal of employees based on union membership); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the state could not put maximum limits
on the number of hours an employer required an employee to work, in this case, of
those in the baking industry); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)
(guaranteeing the right to enter into out-of-state contracts).
OXFORD, supra note 43, at 199.
See id.
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tional protections, however, are not without limit.6 The Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment states, "[n]o person
shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."57 While corporations are included under the
definition of "person" with respect to property rights, 58 liberty
protections have been limited, until now, to natural persons
alone,59 though there may be a current trend in the opposite di-
rection." Despite Fifth Amendment due process protection, cor-
porations are not granted protection against self-incrimination.6
It is agreed that the constitutional protections of the corporation
are currently insufficient and must be increased.62 Nonetheless,
corporations have been granted substantial constitutional pro-
5 For a general overview of corporate rights and protections, see Mayer, supra
note 13; see also "The Right to Govern is Reserved to Citizens": Counting Undocu-
mented Aliens in the Federal Census for Reapportionment Purposes, 135 CONG. REC.
E2804, E2805 (Rep. Jim Slattery) (explaining that corporations, though included
under the interpretation of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, are not in-
cluded as such for apportionment); The Immigration Act of 1989, 135 CONG. REC.
S7858, S7888 (positing that the term "persons" is not used, defined, or interpreted
the same way in every instance in which it is used in the United States Constitu-
tion).
57 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment
differs slightly, its effect is the same. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law").
68 See Rivard, supra note 25, at 1452 n.103 (providing an overview of Court de-
cisions establishing the inclusion of the corporation in the definition of personhood
under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause with respect to property rights).
See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (limiting the protections of the
Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to natural per-
sons); see also Rivard, supra note 25, at 1454 ("[T]here is no coherent theory under-
lyin% corporate entitlement to intangible liberty rights.").
See Rivard, supra note 25, at 1454 (describing the Court's protection of corpo-
rate liberty rights under the Fourth Amendment).
61 See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 92 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Dean, 989 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Wujkowski,
929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991).
6See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RiBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION vii (1995) (declaring that, "[tihe inadequacy of constitutional protec-
tion of the corporation is most glaring in the area of corporate governance"). Cf Seth
H. Ruzi, Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the Open View
Doctrine: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 191, 210-28 (1988)
(arguing that the Court erred in excluding commercial property from Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches in Dow Chemical, 476 U.S.
227 (1986)).
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tections.'
IV. THE CORPORATION AND MODERN CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
The corporate framework, in one form or another, has long
been in existence. 4 Several corporate theories have developed
over the years.' The corporation is, at times, said to "ha[vel an
identity and existence of its own."66 As an independent entity, a
corporation can continue in existence immune from the effects of
shareholder, officer or director death, incapacity, and the effects
of share transfer.
See Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (granting the corporation Fourth Amendment pro-
tection); Rivard, supra note 25, at 1454 (stating that corporations are afforded First
and Fourth Amendment constitutional protection). But see United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (stating that "[w~hile they may and should have
protection from unlawful demands... corporations can claim no equality with indi-
viduals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy") (citation omitted). Morton Salt's
limitation on corporate constitutional protection has been called into question, how-
ever, in Dow Chemical, where the Court examined whether government surveillance
of a corporate facility violated a right to privacy. 476 U.S. at 230-38. The Court,
based on the facts, ultimately concluded that a right to privacy had not been in-
vaded, but fell far short of declaring that no such right existed. See &dL at 239.
c See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 64, at 126 (1976)
(summarizing the ancestry of the modern day American corporation including "the
legislative charter grants of early nineteenth century America, the English royal
trading and colonizing charters of the sixteenth century, the boroughs and religious
orders of the renaissance, the priestly colleges of ancient Rome, and the trading
partnerships of Babylonia or Assyria"); Bad Company: How to Civilize the Corpora-
tion, Dollars & Sense (CNN television broadcast, July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Bad
Company] (describing the formation of early European corporations not as business
enterprises but as "embodiments of social stability and cohesion-monasteries and
universities, boroughs and guilds... reconcil[ing] individual behavior with larger
social ends").
For example, the trust theory is characterized by the notion that the corpora-
tion "belongs" to the investing shareholders. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) reprinted in
FEDERAL OR STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE HEIGHTENING
BATTLE FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 290, 293 (Arthur M. Borden & Herbert A. Ein-
horn, eds., 1978). It is interesting to compare the absolute control theory, namely,
that the groups in control possess absolute authority with no obligation to the gen-
eral community, see id. at 294, with the neutral technology theory, which asserts
that community interests outweigh those of the corporation, and upon a balancing of
their claims and interests, these various groups should be provided with a share of
the income stream based on "public policy rather than private cupidity." Id- at 294-
95. For a general overview of various corporate theories, see David Millon, Theories
of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).
e3 WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FI-
NANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (6th ed. 1996).
See My Corporation (visited Aug. 10, 1998) <http://www.mycorporation.com/
Corporation.htm>.
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Though the corporation has historically been considered
within a property context,8 it is most commonly referred to in
terms of personhood, as the corporation is the representation of
the different persons of whom it is composed.69 Corporate gov-
ernance, "the economic and legal dimensions of the relationship
between shareholders and managers,"7" is founded upon this no-
tion of corporate constituents.7' Some modern theories of the
corporate entity describe the corporation not as a collection of
persons such as shareholders, but as a collection of interested
parties: "employees, creditors, suppliers, [and] community
groups."72
"[Sleparation of ownership and control"7 is a central theme
in modern day corporate governance.' Some corporations have
been subject to scrutiny for making modifications to their organ-
izational structure, including: changing the composition of the
Compare Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of
Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1385-86
(1995) (referring to the historical view that the corporation was merely property
that provided its governing constituents protection from liability and financial gain),
with Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175
(1989) ("[Clontrary to popular belief, it is not particularly useful to think of corpora-
tions in terms of property rights.").
69 Indeed, "[tihe word 'corporation,' derived from the Latin corporatus, made
into a body, designates a body of men joined together for a common purpose." San-
ford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61
TUL. L. REV. 563, 565 (1987). See DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS
AND FOR WHOM 246 (1997) (referring to corporate directors, officers, and sharehold-
ers as the three "critical constituencies").
70 BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at vii (positing various forms of corporate
regulation).
7' See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 66, at 108 (explaining that in order to best
understand a corporation, it is necessary to "decompose" the corporate whole into its
individual components); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39
B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 (1998) ("Corporate law is primarily about shareholder, boards
of directors and managers, and the relationships among them."). The role of share-
holders in modem day corporate governance, however, is questionable at best.
7GREGORY V. VARALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE COUNSEL 5 (1996)
(explaining the expansion of modern corporate theory).
7Ownership is described in the corporate context as having three distinct in-
terests: "interests in an enterprise," "power over an enterprise," and "acting with
respect to the enterprise." BERLE & MEANS, supra note 65, at 290.
4 See id. at 292-93 (posing the notion that shareholder interaction is pivotal to
the corporation and to the regulation of the activity within the corporate hierarchy).
Berle and Means' approach has been characterized by some as the "separation of
ownership and control" thesis. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 2.
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board of directors or its committees, implementing mechanisms
for increasing the autonomy of outside board members, and al-
tering board functions in general. 5 Ideally, the shareholders, a
primary constituency in the corporate composition, should play
an integral role in the corporation's life."6 The role of sharehold-
ers in modern day corporate governance, however, is marginal at
best as their exclusion from corporate decision-making is now
the norm.77 Shareholders regularly have little reason outside of
financial incentive to invest in a corporation. Moreover, al-
though shareholders were once, incorrectly, considered to control
the wealth of the corporation, modern dissatisfaction has been
attributed to the few individuals managing the corporation and
usurping any role the shareholders may have had in the deci-
sion-making process.78
It is true that the actions of corporate entities parallel hu-
man behavior. 9 Generally speaking:
The corporation may cause death, injury, disease, and severe
physical pain by decisions resulting in pollution, poor design,
inadequate quality control, plant safety, and working condi-
tions. Corporations also may impose severe deprivations of in-
come, well-being, and effective personal freedom by decisions on
hiring, firing, employment practices, and plant locations. Fi-
nally, corporations may exercise influence, power, control, and
76 See VARALLO & DRIESBACH, supra note 72, at 5-8 (discussing high-profile
disputes in corporate governance).
7 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 2 (explaining that corporations are
"democratic institutions," and shareholder input to directors and to other aspects of
the corporation is through voting and the proxy mechanism); see also Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The Ali Proj-
ect and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 440 (1985).
7 See John Nichols, Editorial, Unlike Corporations, Unions Practice Democracy,
CAPITAL TIMES, July 7, 1998, at 8A (describing the exclusion of shareholders in cor-
porate mergers and negotiations); see also Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure
as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1086 (1995) (explaining
that as the number of shareholders increases shareholder involvement in business
affairs decreases); Shani L. Fuller, Comment, Shareholders, Directors, dnd Other
Constituencies: Who's On First in Oregon Corporate Takeover Law?, 30 WILIAMETTE
L. REV. 347, 350 (1994) (discussing the decreased shareholder involvement of share-
holders in the Ford Motor Company).
78 See ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 203-04 (1969) (observing that, "[tloday... criti-
cism is ... often directed against the right of private managers, as heads of corpo-
rations, to hold the power of accumulation and investment"); see also BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 65, at 291-92 (explaining that true incentive lies not with the
mass individuals that are engaged in group ownership but with the handful of men
in the board room exercising actual control over the company).
"9 See Schane, supra note 69, at 563 (summarizing various corporate actions).
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even coercion over employees, customers, suppliers, and others
by manipulating expectations of reward and deprivations, by
advertising propaganda, promotions and demotions, not to
mention illegal practices.0
Corporations "may enter into contracts, buy and sell land,
commit torts, sue and be sued, [yet] cannot hold public office [or]
vote in elections."' They can incur debt and are responsible for
the payment of taxes. 2 Corporations also have standing to as-
sert federal claims, such as civil rights violations under section
1983.' Though corporations cannot be imprisoned, they do
qualify as persons under criminal statutes and can be held
criminally liable and accountable for fines.'
Speech on the part of corporate actors, that is, expression of
Abraham J. Briloff, LBOS and MBOS in the Takeover Alphabet Soup: Some
Questions for Lawyers, Answers From an Accountant, 15 J. CORP. L. 171, 195-96
(1990) (emphasis added).
81 Schane, supra note 69, at 563.
"See My Corporation, supra note 67; WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 118 (7th ed. 1995) (discussing
the entity nature of corporations and providing an overview of corporate taxation);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(13) (1991) (authorizing Delaware corporations
to borrow money); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(7) (McKinney 1986) (empowering
New York corporations to borrow money).
See Board of Managers v. West Chester Areas Sch. Dist., 838 F. Supp. 1035,
1041 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 52 F.3d 313 (3d
Cir. 1995) (noting that "[a] corporation is a 'person' entitled to the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment," and that "a 'person' need not be a member of a protected
class to sue under the Fourteenth Amendment or federal civil rights statutes if its
complaint is that it was treated differently because of its association with members
of a protected class"); see also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794
(1st Cir. 1976) (holding that because a plaintiffs corporate status "ha[d] no bearing
on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth Amendments under 42
U.S.C. § 1983"); Auburn Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Peters, 953 F. Supp. 1518, 1520 (M.D. Ala.
1996) ([A] corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the due process clause...
[and] has standing to sue under § 1983 for violations of its due process rights.");
Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU v. Rhode Island Lottery Comm., 553 F. Supp. 752, 768
n.12 (D.R.I. 1982) ("It is well established that a corporation.., has standing to as-
sert violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments under § 1983.").
84See United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1026 (1999) ("Corporations cannot be imprisoned. Only
money is at issue."); Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the
Eighth Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1334-35 (1996)
(discussing the broad definition of "person" in the RICO Act); Richard E. Welch HI,
et. al., Criminal Liability for Professional Partnerships: Two Perspectives, 38
BOSTON B. J. 4, 15 (1994) (describing criminal liability for corporate illegal behavior
as "an accepted cornerstone in federal criminal jurisprudence" and the theory of re-




ideas and espousing of beliefs, is one of the closest parallels be-
tween the corporate world and its human counterpart. Corpo-
rate speech in today's society is commonplace and at times sur-
passes individual speech in terms of effectiveness.' There is no
doubt that corporate speech is included within First Amendment
protections. 8 Though some believe that corporate speech has
grown exponentially out of control and that limitations on this
growth are required, it is conversely warned that "[a]lowing the
government to discriminate against disfavored messages is a
recipe for disaster."'1
It has been argued that the First Amendment does not con-
centrate solely on "speaker autonomy" but also encompasses the
need for the free flow of information to prevent the government
from suppressing contrary views.' According to Justices Holmes
and Brandeis in their noteworthy dissent in Abrams v. United
States,89 "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."" Though
speech plays an obvious role in political awareness, decision
making, and obtaining personal 'information,9 the Court may
6 See Briloff, supra note 80, at 195; Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment
in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42, 51
(1987) ("Corporate speech acquires a superior effectiveness compared to individual
speech because the former can afford a vastly more expensive 'megaphone.' "); Her-
bert I. Schiller, Television is a Social-Not a Biological or Technological-Problem,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1169, 1174 ("Philip Morris and Time-Warner 'speak,' and millions of
households, domestically and internationally, hear their voices, amplified by na-
tional television. In comparison, the individual citizen's voice, if expressed loudly
enough, may reach across the living room.").
"a See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 US. 765, 778, 784 (1978)
(addressing "whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives th[e] proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection" and holding
that a corporation is not deprived of such First Amendment protection regardless of
whether a "material effect on its business or property" exists); id. at 804 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("There is now little doubt that corporate communications come within
the scope of the First Amendment.").
8 Stephen R. Shapiro, in Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism
Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 16.
m See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 (articulating the purposes of the First Amend-
ment, including "its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas"); Kathleen Sullivan, in Speech and Power:
Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 18 (discussing
the dangers of allowing excessive government intervention in the regulation of
speech).
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'x See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at 59 (discussing corporate campaign
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have failed to distinguish the protection of First Amendment
speech from private corporate regulation.' Though some believe
that corporate speech must be curtailed, this idea must be dis-
tinguished from the notion of taming the giant corporation by
regulating and limiting it through other laws, including antitrust
laws,93 the imposition of corporate taxes,' and the promotion of
labor unions.95
It is important to determine whether the expansion of corpo-
rate speech is really due to corporate domination of individual
rights per se or to a simple gap between wealth and the lack
thereof." It is a common contention that the marketplace of
ideas97 is now dominated by the "rich, who outspend their rivals
and distort public debate."98 Inevitably, money has the ability to
purchase power and influence. Cognizant of these economic
gaps, however, corporations have aggressively used First
Amendment privileges to gain certain benefits in attempts to de-
feat progress in corporate income tax referenda, health and
safety investigations, and criminal antitrust actions. 9  Corporate
activities in a First Amendment context).
9'2See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 12 (emphasizing that "the current Supreme
Court 'cannot seem to distinguish between government efforts to censor speech and
government efforts to regulate private power' ").
"See id.
94See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at vii (positing various forms of cor-
porate regulation).
95 See id.
96 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 65, at 295 ("A couple of hundred corporate
managers can make decisions controlling most of our industrial economy."). Cer-
tainly, this is not a new notion. See THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 91 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The prosperity of commerce is now perceived
and acknowledged.. . as the most productive source of national wealth.").
97 Justice Holmes emphasized the importance of this "free trade in ideas."
Abrahms, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The importance of maintaining a
fluid and healthy "marketplace of ideas" has been celebrated time and again by the
Court. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 769 (1996); Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).
98 Shapiro, supra note 87, at 16; see also James A. Gardner, Protecting the Ra-
tionality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 892, 918, 933 (1984) (discussing the ability of wealthy political candi-
dates to win elections by outspending poorer rivals, and to "distort the expression of
the electoral will"); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Imple-
menting Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV.
189, 191-92 (1991) (explaining that wealthy political candidates wield greater con-
trol over the mass media, enabling those candidates to win office seats by outspend-
ing opponents).
See Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1 (describing specific instances
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assertion of constitutional rights has not been limited to the
First Amendment; corporations have also attempted to invoke
certain Fourth Amendment privileges, such as Dow Chemical
Company's unsuccessful attempt to use the unreasonable search
and seizure clause as a way to circumvent governmental moni-
toring of its compliance with environmental laws.'00
Though it may appear that corporations are granted rights
more liberally than are individuals, the fact that corporations
take full advantage of the constitutional rights they are granted
hardly something to criticize. In Minneapolis & St. Louis Rail-
way Co. v. Beckwith,' the Supreme Court clearly recognized the
right of corporations to "invoke the benefits of... the Constitu-
tion and laws which guarantee to persons the enjoyment of prop-
erty, or afford to them the means for its protection, or prohibit
legislation injuriously affecting it.""°2 Though the growing de-
mand for modern corporate social responsibility likely results in
faulting corporations for using or, in the opinion of some, abusing
the rights granted them, perhaps the problem lies not in the ex-
ercise of these rights, but in the granting of such rights in the
first place, which allows the corporate entity to become so power-
ful. Nevertheless, the power of the modern corporation is unde-
niable. The actual extent of corporate power may not be fully
understood: 3
Speech is power.... Yesterday's free speech principles have be-
come today's power principles-for the powerful... The prob-
lem traces back at least to... when the Supreme Court first
treated corporations as persons entitled to constitutional liber-
ties... [C]ommunication is the handmaiden of commerce...
by Boston and Idaho companies from 1978-1988); My Corporation, supra note 67
(delineating the various constitutional rights granted the modem day corporation
including the freedom of speech on public issues irrespective of material corporate
effect); Nader and Mayer, supra note 12 (claiming that corporations have
acorrupt[ed] the political process in a manner neither the Framers of the Bill of
Rights nor the creators of the [Fourteenth] Amendment even dreamed would be
possible"). See generally Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, CAL. MGMT. REV., Jan. 1, 1998, at 8 ("Corporations have become stead-
ily more aggressive and effective in the political arena during the past several dec-
ades.").
'0 See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding
that a warrant is not needed for aerial observations and photographs of an indus-
trial complex).101 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
1021 I at 28.
'0 See Shapiro, supra note 87, at 11-12.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Money is speech... [and] it is power. And when moneyed
speech receives new absolute protection, the power dynamic of
freedom changes immensely.... In the process, citizen democ-
racy succumbs to corporate democracy.' 4
Whether corporations have "absolute protection" and
whether "citizen democracy" has succumbed to "corporate de-
mocracy" is subject to debate. Though it is commonplace to as-
sert that corporations are taking advantage of individuals and
their rights, corporations undoubtedly have positive influences
upon society. 05 The increased dominance of the corporation has
benefited the country's economic growth and development."5
Corporate entities impact society in a positive way, creating
benefits for many to whom they would otherwise be unavail-
able. 7 Nevertheless, though corporations may benefit the na-
104 Ronald KLL. Collins & David M. Skover, in Speech and Power: Is First
Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 12.
'05 See Society and Polities Greenpeace: The Economist Chronicles Group's Evo-
lution, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Aug. 5, 1998 (attributing the idea that
"[Elfforts by multinational corporations to address environmental issues have re-
duced the need for activist groups" to an essay published in Economist).
10 See BERLE, supra note 78, at 379 (1969) ("Corporate power has served the
United States well. In substantial measure, the material prosperity of the country is
due to it."). But see David Friedman, Opinion, Back to Basics: Greed and Spin have
Replaced Discipline and Collaboration as the Engines of Economic Growth, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at ml (concluding that "[tihe nation's future lies in fostering
[entrepreneurship rather than] the corporate dinosaurs of years past").
'0' See Reich, supra note 99, at 8 (describing a new trend in corporate respon-
sibility and an apparent corporate interest in placing increased importance on the
societal effects of its operations rather than the typical emphasis on investor wealth
maximization); David Ong-Yeoh, Companies: Call for Good Corporate Governance
Growing, Bus. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at 6 (indicating an example of the growing belief
that "companies must be responsible for their decisions which impact on society"
and the understanding that "when business[es] make decisions today, it impacts on
society so... social, ethical and environmental factors [must be considered]"); id.
("[Glood corporate citizenship is also good for business."); Marilyn Carlson Nelson,
Giving Back to the Community: Corporate Responsibility, Address at the Greater
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce's Portfolio Series Luncheon (Nov. 12, 1997), in
VITAL SPEECHES 343 (Mar. 15, 1998) ("Clearly, philanthropy is not hazardous to
corporate health!").
For instance, International Business Machine Systems (IBM) has supported
those with learning disabilities through "product ideas, subsidized access to lBM's
speech technology, research with disabled students, loan of the time of IBM engi-
neers, direct financial grants and marketing" while Intel "has provided millions of
dollars of the best Intel microprocessors for.., use in... systems for [the dis-
abled]." Technologies for the Disabled, Developing Partnerships for Assistive and
Universally Designed Technology for Persons with Disabilities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Technology of the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of James R. Fruchterman, President, Arkenstone Inc.) (providing exam-
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tion, the overall detrimental effect on individuals and society ap-
pear, perhaps, to tip the scale in the opposite direction.
Corporations reap benefits above and beyond those of nor-
mal citizens and, as a result, may limit individual rights and
freedoms. The rights of the private individual sacrificed at the
expense of the corporate giant is an all-too-common characteri-
zation.' As a result, corporations have come to be viewed as
self-ruling entities and dominators of power and control, 9 hav-
ing been described as more powerful than the Nazi movement."0
For example, in revisiting the expansive arena of corporate
speech one finds that the corporation may have thwarted the ef-
fect of the voice of the individual."' This monopoly is not only
perceived in the forum of commercial or personal speech, but
applies also to political speech and discourse. It is a popular
sentiment that big business dominates the government itself,
with the voices of citizens going unheard."
Examples exist outside of speech as well, with the environ-
mental arena serving as another forum of concern. Corporations,
it is argued, continuously violate environmental laws. Though
they may suffer public relations backlashes, such violations are
small concerns to corporate survival since the corporation can
pass costs incurred on to consumers and since the revocation of
its corporate charter is improbable."' Corporations have also
ples of the exercise of corporate responsibility by large corporations); see also Reich,
supra note 99, at 8 (noting an example of corporate desire to "invest in the future").
"s An additional factor is the possibility that the bar has deserted its responsi-
bility to represent and protect the people and has become an extension of the corpo-
ration. See Morton Mintz, No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Jus-
tice in America, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1, 1997, at 42 (positing that certain attorneys
represent the interests of the large, private corporation at the expense of the inter-
ests of the nation).
' See Briloff, supra note 80, at 195 ("The corporation is both a product of and a
contributing participant in the power structure and belief system of society."); Floyd
Abrams, in Speech and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete?, NATION,
July 21, 1997, at 12 (questioning whether "corporations have too much to say in de-
termining national policy").
See Wendy Kaminer, in Speech and Power: is First Amendment Absolutism
Obsolete?, NATION, July 21, 1997, at 14 ("But if Nazis are more vicious than the av-
erage corporation they're also less powerful; their ravings have relatively little effect
on the democratic process or the free flow of ideas.").
11 See id.
112 See Bennett, supra note 21, at 85; Mark Presky, Letter to the Editor, Ruling
Against Campaign Limits, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at B6 ("The interests of the
people will be heard only when the great moneyed influences are quieted.").U See Thomas Linzey, Awakening a Sleeping Giant: Creating a Quasi-Private
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been criticized for receiving preferential treatment, for example,
in the form of tax subsidies over and above those received by
their individual, private citizen counterparts.1 4 Corporations are
clearly subject to taxation; but the corporate tax agenda is often
fulfilled to a greater extent than that of private citizens, with
taxpayers "pad[ding] profits for big businesses."1 5 Not only do
corporations reap benefits from governmental favoritism but
"systems of accountability are endangered" when corporations
become too familiar with the government."6
Corporations have been referred to as "artificial persons"
which have been "award[ed] ... superhuman privileges" by the
judicial branch of government. 7 Some have gone so far as to
consider them "unaccountable Frankensteins" with quasi-human
powers "nonetheless constitutionally shielded from.., law en-
forcement [and] accountability to real persons such as workers,
consumers and taxpayers."18 Moreover, corporations bear the
reputation of "not ever be[ing] trusted,"1 and are often regarded
as entities with disproportionate advantages over society at the
expense of its individual members."0 Is it, however, a valid
Cause of Action for Revoking Corporate Charters in Response to Environmental Vio-
lations, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 219, 224 (1995) (postulating that the ability to re-
voke corporate charters because of abuses or violations has become meaningless).
114 Federal spending could be reduced by approximately $150 billion annually
with the elimination of corporate subsidies, grants, and tax breaks. See Ray Santis-
teban, Editorial, Aid to Dependent Corporations, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 4, 1997
(explaining that approximately 60% of domestic corporations and 74% of interna-
tional corporations were excused from the payment of federal taxes, causing the
government to forego approximately $150 billion in potential tax revenues).
115 Modern public corporations are astounding in size and worth, with their
value often exceeding the gross national product of many nations. In 1994, General
Motors led sales with $123 billion, Federal National Mortgage led in assets with
$273 billion, General Motors led in profits with $5.7 billion, and General Electric led
in market value of common stock worth $92.5 billion.
'16 Harry Hurt I, Parks Brought to you by... Can IMG do for Cities What it
Has Done for Tiger Woods and the Pope?, in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 11,
1997, at 42.
117 Corporations are Not Persons, supra note 1.
118 Id.
" Frank Antonucci, Editorial, Corporate Greed Time for Union to Draw the
Line Against Carrier, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), April 16, 1998, at All,
available in 1998 WL 4350951 (describing Carrier corporation's threat to close its
operations and its alleged attempt to place the blame on company employees).
"0 See Terry Anderson, Viewpoints, One Way the U.S. is a Force of Evil,
BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 14, 1998, at B3, available in 1998 WL 5991828 (alleging the
involvement of major United States corporations in international arms trade and
blaming America for worldwide societal devastation).
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proposition that corporations are abusing the rights they have
been granted to the detriment of greater society? 1  There is a
movement to subject corporations to greater regulation,m sup-
ported by the belief that the government has unjustifiably
granted the corporation too much power. The government must
derive its powers from "the great body of the society, [rather
than] from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of
it."' The question then seems to be whether modern day corpo-
rations represent such a "favored class" given disproportionate
constitutional protection by the Court. In defining the rights of
various groups the Court has employed the legal fiction to extend
constitutional rights to groups that otherwise would be denied
those protections. But are these legal fictions being drawn by
the Court to suit its own desires as well as those of politically-
empowered corporate interests? The answer appears to lie in the
determination of whether the corporation fits within the frame-
work of the Fourteenth Amendment "person"2 or whether it is
one of the more flagrant and persistent abuses of the legal fiction
constructed by the Court.
V. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: EVOLVING OR
GOVERNING?
The Constitution has been described as a "Living Constitu-
tion"m that "would have snapped if it had not been permitted to
121 Some would answer in the affirmative. For example, revelations of corporate
exploitation of children in the workplace seem, today, routine. See Nicole J. Krug,
Note, Exploiting Child Labor: Corporate Responsibility and the Role of Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 14 N.Y.L. SOH. J. HUM. RTS. 651, 651 (1998) (describing the
problem as one of "epidemic proportions").
122 See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 62, at ix. "[Tihe corporate form is so
powerful that it needs to be controlled to limit massive externalization of costs by
corporations and wealth transfers to corporations from other groups. [Furthermore,]
regulation is needed to protect corporate investors from malfeasance by remote cor-
porate managers." Id.
'23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
124 See supra note 5 (quoting the text of the Fourteenth Amendment). It has
been posited that the framers of the United States Constitution did not intend for
the document to address specific situations but, rather, that the words of the Con-
stitution govern through a comprehensive interpretation of its terms. See SCALIA,
supra note 10, at 37 ("In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the con-
text of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words
and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation-though not an inter-
pretation that the language will not bear.").
125 SCALIA, supra note 10, at 42.
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bend and grow."2 ' It is apparent that "American society... has
undergone constant change in virtually all facets of its exis-
tence-geography, demography, economics, law, politics, tech-
nology, employment, industrialization,... social structure[,] ...
environmental conditions [and] international affairs."M One
may opine that the meanings of certain terms and interpreta-
tions by the Framers should not be used as definitions centuries
later to establish the parameters of constitutional rights.m Ac-
cordingly, "[l]egal change" is required "to respond to the existing
and often changing social or economic conditions."129 What, how-
ever, should the "guiding principle" for this judicial evolution
be?'30 Some maintain the answer is public opinion13' while others
argue it is the will of the majority.'32 As a government that al-
lows, moreover promotes, the evolution of public opinion, the
concept of a Living Constitution transforms33 a historic govern-
ing document into a fluid document reflecting majority views
rather than providing a governing and continuous mandate of
126 Id. at 41. Various approaches to constitutional interpretation exist. Original-
ism is the doctrine of interpretation which adheres to the language and history of
the Constitution. Justice Antonin Scalia is one of the strongest proponents of this
theory. See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2; see also Carter, supra
note 15 (explaining that Justice Scalia, together with Chief Justice Rehnquist, have
come to be known as "apostles of ... judicial restraint"). Conversely, judicial activ-
ism erases such boundaries and calls for a stronger interaction between constitu-
tional law and real politics. See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.
127 BARRY R. SCHALLER, A VISION OF AMERICAN LAW: JUDGING LAW, LIT-
ERATURE, AND THE STORIES WE TELL 120 (1997) (describing change as
"inevitable... desirable and even necessary").
128 See Laurence H. Tribe, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at
85-86 ("It seems to me quite impossible to sustain the proposition that under-
standings or meanings frozen circa 1791 can possibly serve as the definitive limits to
certain freedoms as enforced today.").
129 SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 120-21 (emphasis omitted).
130 SCALIA, supra note 10, at 45.
'1 But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) ("[Glovernment [has] been instituted... [blecause the passions of
men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint."). As
such, it appears that the government was originally envisioned to control the popu-
lar will and to funnel it into the legislative process. See id. at 109 (establishing that
the ultimate power in the newly formed union must rest with the "persons of the
citizens").
132 See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 47 ("If the courts are free to write the Consti-
tution anew, they will... write it the way the majority wants .... This, of course, is
the end of the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very body it
was meant to protect against: the majority.").
122 See id. at 44-45 (explaining that the entire idea of living constitutionalism is
diametrically opposed to the "antievolutionary purpose of a constitution").
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the rights of the country's inhabitants. The Court, "[b]y trying to
make the Constitution do everything that needs [to be done]
from age to age, [will] have caused it to do nothing at all.""
The success of our government is based on a document that
is over 200 years old and has only twenty-seven constitutional
amendments. Though in the past the amendment process was
relied upon to initiate constitutional change, today the modern
judiciary has assumed that role. For example, if the Nineteenth
Amendment,'35 which granted women the right to vote, was an
issue today, it is likely that judicial initiative rather than consti-
tutional amendment would be the mechanism used to implement
such a change. 3 The Court, as demonstrated through the con-
cept of the legal fiction, has in fact bent and stretched the Con-
stitution to afford rights where it has deemed it appropriate and
to deny them where perhaps more merited. It is debatable
whether the Constitution should evolve or govern. But if
"bending" and "growing" are, in fact, valid propositions, it logi-
cally follows that as the Court created the legal framework for
the recognition and protection of the personhood of the corporate
entity in the 1880s, it has the prerogative and should do the
same for the fetus in the 1990s.1
7
VI. INRE LIFE: CORPORATION V. FETUS
Though a corporation is now included in the constitutional
definition of personhood, this legal fiction at some point natu-
rally exhausts itself. A corporation, however defined, does not
and cannot carry with it those biological and psychological char-
acteristics which vivify a person-namely life. Though a subject
in its own right, the judicial creation of the corporate person
serves as a natural springboard to genuine issues of personhood.
'241d. at 47. See Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McCallister, An Eagle Soaring: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 304 (1997) ("An
evolving constitution may travel through the vagaries of time, but a dead constitu-
tion-in all of its stillness-affords protection not just for the moment, and not for
one person, but for all time and for all people.").
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.").
'3" See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 47.
137 For the view that a fetus may still deserve certain protections even if it does
not fall within the constitutional definition of a "person," see LEONARD GLANTz,
ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS 107 (H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr. & Stuart
F. Spicker eds., 1984).
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One is led to explore the realistic and practical ramifications of
denying the fetus those protections guaranteed by the constitu-
tional framers-namely life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness.
13 8
Corporate personhood is not the first and most certainly will
not be the last of legal fictions,139 yet it is certainly one of the
more visible. Courts have engaged in an intellectual shell game
to offer corporations protections while simultaneously denying
such protections to other beings, such as fetuses, though they
come closer to "living" than does the corporate entity.1 41 It has
been posited that corporations are substantially similar to "flesh-
and-blood human" beings and, as such, are rightfully considered
persons." But the relationship between the fetus and the per-
138 See SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 156-57 (citing Myrdal, a mid-twentieth
century European commentator, who stated that "Americans 'of all national origins,
religion, creeds, and colors .... hold in common the most explicitly expressed system
of general ideals' of any Western nation [including] 'the essential dignity and equal-
ity of all human beings, of inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and opportunity'.")
(footnotes omitted); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 803 n.11
(1980) (asserting that Blackstone's vision of liberty influenced the Framers and
quoting his statement that -'[tihe right of personal security consists in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his
reputation'") (emphasis omitted). Does it, then, withstand reason that the
"inalienable right to opportunity" includes the right to be born into the world?
'9 The legal fiction is a tool commonly used in legal jurisprudence. See United
States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the idea that no wrong can be committed by the
ruler, as "the vainest of all legal fictions"); Conservatorship v. Drabick, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 854 (Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging that allowing an unconscious patient
to choose whether to receive medical treatment is a legal fiction). A legal fiction is
also assumed by Justice O'Connor in using the reasonable observer for endorsement
test purposes, which is, in her view, "a personification of a community ideal of rea-
sonable behavior, determined by the... social judgment." Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (quoting PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
635-36 (1989).
14 See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corpora-
tion in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1451 (1987) (discussing courts'
treatment of corporations as persons). In contrast to corporations, partnerships are
not treated as citizens. See Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456
(1900); see also Robert J. Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Bar-
ney: A New Diversity Test for Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 89, 130 n.36 (1995) (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs.,
494 U.S. 185, 189, 196-97 (1990)).
141 See Schane, supra note 69, at 564 (noting that the Supreme Court has been
defining corporate personality since the nineteenth century). But corporations are
not "persons" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy clause. See Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988).
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son is more intellectually and physiologically analogous than is
the fictional relationship between the corporation and the per-
son." Does it stand to reason that the framers intended the cor-
poration to receive greater personhood protection than the fetus?
Some would answer in the affirmative.43  But if the "artificial
being"' of the corporation, composed of technical rules of gov-
erance,145 can be afforded the same protections as a human be-
ing, should not a fetus, arguably living, be afforded the same?1
46
It seems this rationale can be reduced to basic common sense
which, arguably, is lacking in the current governance of this na-
tion.4
The term "person" may have a broad legal definition. For example, in statutory
form "person" may refer to "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partner-
ships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1
(1994); see also United States v. Best Foods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (1998) ("The term
'person' is defined in CERCLA to include corporations and other business organiza-
tions."); Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Non Statutory Review Revisited, 97
COLUT. L. REV. 1612, 1709 n.385 (1997) (citing Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L.
REV. 363, 379 (1930-1931) for the proposition that an odd reversal has occurred be-
tween the term "person" and "corporation" over time). Although using "person" to
refer to a corporation began as a fiction, this usage has become so widely accepted
that it is now necessary to say "natural person" when referring to a "person" who is
not a "corporation." See Siegel, supra at 1709.
See Charles Wolfe, Joseph Lambert to Succeed Stephens as Chief Justice,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., June 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7421438
(quoting newly-appointed Justice Joseph E. Lambert of the Kentucky Supreme
Court who stated that a viable fetus should be protected by criminal law in the same
way a "person" is).
43 Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should be Overruled, 67 N.C. L. REV.
939, 942 n.21 (1989) ("There is not a shred of historical evidence, of which I am
aware, that would suggest that the framers thought of fetuses as persons against
whom the State could not act except with due process of law.").
1" Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819) (describing the corporate entity as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law... [and] possesses only those properties
which the [state-created] charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or
as incidental to its very existence").
" "Corporations" should be distinguished, however, from "companies." See
CONARD, supra note 64, at 136-38 (distinguishing the technical aspect of the corpo-
ration from the company which encompasses companionship, fellowship, and rela-
tionships between partners).
146 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) (defining
"life" as an "animate being- the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional be-
ing from a dead body or purely chemical matter").
247 See SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 123 (stating that government tends to
"operate to frustrate and humiliate citizens in defiance of common sense" and citing
Philip K. Howard for the proposition that "by the absence of the one indispensable
ingredient of any successful human endeavor: use of judgment... we have con-
structed a [legal] system [which] basically outlaws common sense" (citing PHILIP K.
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The constitutional framers foresaw the liberty interests of
future generations, as evidenced by their desire to explicitly se-
cure the right of "posterity."14"8 Rationalizing the exclusion of the
fetus'4 9 from the definition of constitutional personhood while at
the same time including the corporation appears inconsistent.
Assuming, arguendo, that the inclusion of the fetus was not in-
tended by the framers, the Court is free to treat the fetus in the
same way it has treated the corporation and create constitu-
tional protections unfounded in the constitutional text for the fe-
tus.80 Accordingly, the Court should further its pronouncement
of rights under the "evolving constitution"'' by following the
guideline that "new rights are needed as a way of instrumentally
advancing and making more secure the broad purposes of ex-
pressly mentioned rights."'52 It would seem, based on past ac-
tions, that the Court could confidently protect the interests of the
fetus by creating new rights through legal fiction or through any
other device of its choice.
"The corporation does not exist in nature; unlike real per-
sons it has no existence independent of the government that cre-
HowARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA
(1994)).
'4 See U.S. CONST. preamble ("We the People of the United States, in Order
to... secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.") (emphasis added);
WEBSTER'S, supra note 146 (defining "posterity" as "the offspring of one progenitor
to the furthest generation... all succeeding generations"). The framers' vision to
guarantee future security parallels Biblical scripture. See Proverbs 29:18.("Where
there is no vision the people perish.") Furthermore, it is posited that the Constitu-
tion and the structure of government was meant, implicitly perhaps, to serve as a
means to achieving the spiritual guarantees articulated in the preamble. See
MACEY, OUR AMERICAN LEVIATHAN UNBOUND, supra note 24, at 66.
"9 See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2 (listing Justice Blackmun's
reasons for denying the fetus Fourteenth Amendment protection as: (1) lack of legal
precedent; (2) uncertainty as to the Framers' intent to have the word "person" apply
to fetuses based on its usage in constitutional text; and (3) because limitations on
abortions were not as strict when the amendment was adopted).
150 See supra note 10 and infra note 175 and accompanying text (positing that
the Court has in fact created rights not explicit in the text of the United States Con-
stitution specifically with respect to corporations).
161 See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 41-42 (describing features of an evolving con-
stitution). But see Fox & McCallister, supra note 134, and accompanying text
(describing the benefits of a sound, unevolving governing document). See generally,
JETHRO F, LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION: How THE SUPREME COURT
HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING (1992).
152 VAN GEEL, supra note 23, at 81 (discussing Chief Justice Warrens creation of
the right to a "Miranda warning").
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ates it." 5' This concept of personhood was considered early on by
Blackstone: "Natural persons are such as the God of nature
formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by hu-
man laws, for the purposes of society and government, and are
called corporations or bodies politic."'5 True, the fetus has not
been granted the benefit of the legal fiction to establish its
"existence" or its "artificial personhood." Nevertheless, and more
convincing of fetal personhood is that the fetus exists, realisti-
cally, entirely independent of the government. Though the cor-
poration is totally dependent on the government for its "life," the
fetus has life irrespective of whether the government endows it
with one. Some maintain that the corporation indeed exists, and
that it merely relies on the government to afford it a
"personality" via the construct of a legal fiction.5 ' Whence the
corporation gets its existence is largely irrelevant. "The law
[treats] the corporation... in many respects as though it were a
natural person-which assuredly it is not."5 ' And, if the
"existing" corporation is granted a personality and legal rights,
then the fetus, whose existence is independent of the govern-
ment, should be given the benefit of a fiction as well, whether it
be of "life" or of "personality." It is alarming that the judiciary
has granted greater freedoms and protections to the completely
fictional de jure corporate person than to the de facto fetal life
already in existence.
The reasons for lack of fetal protection remain open for de-
bate. Approximately three in ten pregnancies end in abortion,'57
and although fetal abortion appears to be declining, such statis-
tics lend support to the intensity of the abortion contest.'58 Out-
I' Bad Company, supra note 64.
14 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 67 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., Wash-
ington Law Book 1941) (emphasis added).15 See WORMSER, supra note 16, at 8 ("Whatever of 'iction'... is involved in the
conception of the corporation is found in the fact that the law endows the corpora-
tion with personality.").
1; Id. (emphasis added).
'7 See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIB-
ERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 173 (1997). Compare with CNN Interactive, Public
Outcry Comes Too Late to Stop Controversial Abortion (visited July 25, 1998)
<http://cnn.con/WORLD/9608/06/britain.twins> (noting that the abortion rate in
Great Britain, where abortion was legalized in 1967, is approximately one abortion
for every four births).
1 See generally MARK CRUTCHER, ACCESS THE KEY TO PRO-LIFE VICTORY 19
(1998) (noting that abortion rates in the nation and in the majority of states de-
clined between the late 1980s and early 1990s) (citing statistics of the Alan
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side of the traditional "liberty" arguments currently dissemi-
nated that balance the rights of the mother against those of the
unborn, one argument for the continued denial is the inevitable
commotion that would arise in current constitutional law were
the Court to recognize the fetus as a person entitled protection. 59
Another argument for lack of fetal protection is the negative ef-
fect such protection would have on medical advances and treat-
ments.16 ° Nevertheless, in 1997, one-half of Americans consid-
ered abortion on par with the murdering of a child.16' A 1987
survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute listed the top four rea-
sons for aborting a fetus as: (1) concerns about the way a child
would affect the mother's life; (2) inability to afford the child; (3)
desires to avoid single parenthood or existing problems in a re-
lationship; and (4) lack of preparation for child-rearing respon-
sibilities.62 Opponents of abortion argue that the primary rea-
son for aborting the fetus is convenience coupled with a complete
disregard for the living. Supporters of these positions condemn
the use of abortion as a cure for "physical or psychological dis-
comfort of the mother, over-population, financial hardships, [or]
social insecurity."
6 3
The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,'64 addressed the above-
Guttmacher Institute); id. (stating that the abortion rate in the United States dur-
ing the 1980s decreased by six per cent); U.S. Abortion Rate Fell Again in 1995,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, December 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4895208 (according to
the Center for Disease Control, the percentage of legal abortions performed in 1995
had "[fallen to] the lowest level in two decades"); id. (drawing a correlation between
the decrease in the number of available abortion providers and the number of abor-
tions being performed).
169 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993).
160 See Michael S. Simon, Note, "Honey, I Froze the Kids": Davis v. Davis and the
Legal Status of Early Embryos, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 132-33 (1991) (suggesting
the detrimental effects of including early embryos within the legal definition of
"personhood" on modem infertility treatment).
161 See Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2 (citing a New York Times
poll).
1 2 See Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abor-
tions? FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES, July/Aug. 1988, at 169-70.
163 See JOHN MEYENDORFF, MARRIAGE: AN ORTHODOX PERSPECTIVE 64 (1984)
(positing that though these "social evils" need to be solved, abortion is not the solu-
tion). Meyendorff also opines that "[f abortion is accepted as a normal procedure in
facing the ills of society, there is absolutely no reason why illing could not be ac-
cepted as a 'solution'... in other situations, particularly in illness and old age." I&
at 64.
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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mentioned anti-abortion arguments when it weighed the rights
of the fetus as a person against the mother's liberty right to abort
the fetus." In Roe, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether a fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 66 Rather then answer this question abso-
lutely, the Court held that a state's interest in protecting "fetal
life" only becomes compelling subsequent to viability.'6 7 That is,
a fetus is not afforded protection as a "person" before birth, but is
afforded some protection after it becomes viable. The Court, in
effect, decided that the status of the unborn should depend solely
on the liberty interests of its mother."
Several justifications were provided in support of this con-
troversial decision. Justice Blackmun articulated that one of the
reasons the fetal protection claim had to fail was because there
was no case law supporting the classification of a fetus as a
"person!' under the Fourteenth Amendment.'69 Another factor
' See id. at 151-52; Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.
'6 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 ("All this... persuades us that the word 'person,' as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.") (footnote omit-
ted). Certain states, including Wisconsin and Connecticut, have diverted from this
conclusion. See id. at 158 n.55.
'67 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-164 (defining "viability" as the point at which the
unborn "presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb[,]" and, as such, the time at which the state has a compelling interest to pro-
tect the fetus); see also Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Abortion
and Fetal Viability (visited July 26, 1998) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
library/abortion/fetalviability.html> (providing a general overview of the fetal viabil-
ity issue).
1 3 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 ("[The unborn have never been recognized in the
law as persons in the whole sense."); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation
of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy,
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1986) (reiterating the traditional ra-
tionale articulated in Roe that the fetus had no individual rights independent of its
mother).
The victory of a woman's liberty interest over the life of the fetus in Roe has
been challenged by recent state legislation limiting a pregnant woman's freedom.
See Pregnant Drug Abusers Face Detention, CHICAGO TRIB., June 17, 1998, at 16,
available in 1998 WL 2867478 (describing a recent Wisconsin law which allows vari-
ous professionals to report drug or alcohol abusing pregnant women to the authori-
ties who can then have the women hospitalized or sent to a rehabilitation center);
Bob Herbert, Fetal Protection Conceals Real Agenda, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINAL, June
16, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 6333375 (citing a New York Times article on
the new Wisconsin law and emphasizing that the law provides no criminal sanctions
although it does allow authorities to take action against abusive women. Conversely,
the article proceeds to note that viewing the fetus as a person could lead to an ero-
sion of women's rights, particularly the right to have an abortion.).
19 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157; see also Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note
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the Court relied on was the use of the word "person" in other in-
stances in the Constitution clearly did not include the fetus.
170
This legal reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny. The argument
that the use of a term throughout the Constitution generally
should determine its meaning in specific instances is certainly
flawed as it assumes a uniformity of meaning that may not exist.
In fact, a wide application of this principle would call into ques-
tion the constitutional rights of otherwise protected parties.'
For example, though children are at times a protected class, all
constitutional provisions referring to "persons" do not apply
prima facie to children. Based on this rationale, one could
deny children and newborn infants constitutional protections
and justify the decision by citing the instances throughout the
Constitution in which children are not included in the definition
of a "person."'73 Thus, infanticide theoretically would be consti-
tutionally permissible. 4 Should we then apply this reasoning to
corporations? The corporation, as a "person," has been denied
constitutional protections in certain instances, yet it remains
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on Black-
mun's reasoning in Roe, one could use instances where constitu-
tional personhood protection was not afforded to the corporation
to preclude the corporation from receiving Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection. 5
Should the Court's rationales in Roe be held in high esteem?
To reiterate, the Court's reasoning has also been criticized for
determining the interests of the fetus based on the interests of
others,76 mirroring the Dred Scott era.17 As a result, by denying
2.
170 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157; see also Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note
2.




175 As established, though the corporation has been afforded legal personhood
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, it has not been granted the right
against self-incrimination also guaranteed a "person" by the Fifth Amendment. See
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (holding this right limited to natural per-
sons).
176 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (conditioning fetal right to life upon the mother's
right to privacy).
177 See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856) (concluding that the ability
of blacks to claim the rights and privileges of the Constitution hinged on the status
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fetal personhood protections, "the Court created [an entire] class
of human beings who are disposable property."17 Despite the
later Court's unwillingness to overrule Roe in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey,"9 the Court's reasoning in Roe may be described
as an "arbitrary resolution of the abortion matter, no different in
kind from the bare minimum that our politics could have sup-
plied."80
The Supreme Court's decision in Casey has, in turn, been
vehemently criticized for its exemplification of a complete disre-
of their ancestors). The Court's decisions have been criticized for this erred reason-
ing in the determination of rights:
[Roe] is simply wrong... [in] permit[ting] one individual's status as a per-
son [to] depend upon the interests of others. We have had some awful ex-
perience with that ideology, and it took a civil war to clean up the mess left
by the Supreme Court which bought into that approach in Dred Scott.
Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2, at 10.
178 136 CONG. REC. 25,36334 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hum-
phreA).505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey reaffirmed Roe's central holding that a pregnant
woman's right to privacy enabled her to choose whether to abort her pregnancy. But
a plurality rejected Roe's trimester analysis and recognized instead a state's sub-
stantial interest in potential life. See id. at 872-73; Robert L. Stenger, The Law and
Assisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom and United States, 9 J.L. & HEALTH
135, 137 (1994-95) (assessing Casey's impact on the Roe decision).
Roe's viability as legal precedent is debatable. Advances in science and technol-
ogy prompt constant debate as to whether an opinion, relying on scientific knowl-
edge over 25 years old, should remain legally binding. See Stenger, supra at 158
("While medical and technological developments continue to change ... it remains a
challenge to express experience and change in the law."). This problem seems to
have been foreshadowed at the time of the Roe decision itself. See Jay Floyd, Esq.,
Asst. Att'y Gen. of Texas, Argument Before the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade (Dec. 13, 1971) (transcript available at <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/ roe.
wade/audio/argue/transcript.html> (visited June 11, 1998)) ("As medical science
progresses, maybe the law will progress also."). It is clear that the scientific under-
pinnings of the Roe and Casey decisions are disputable today, particularly as medi-
cal advances continuously push the point of viability to earlier stages in fetal devel-
opment. See Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 139 (N.H. 1980) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that using any specific timetable for determining fetal viability is
problematic because "it turns open the ever-changing progress in the field of medi-
cal science"). Indeed, current scientific breakthroughs have been deemed the
"unimaginable." Rhonda Rowland, Scientists Analyze Days-Old Embryo for Genetic
Defects (visited July 26, 1998) <http://cnn.com/HEALTHindepth.health/
womens.healthlembryo.diagnosis/index.html>.
'80 Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Professor John
Ely, a supporter of legal abortion, who remarked that "Roe is bad because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law") (emphasis added).
Id. at 8; see also Stenger, supra note 179, at 138 (opining that one of the main flaws
in the Roe decision was that the Supreme Court's decision left no room for states to
formulate their own solutions).
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gard for the original foundation on which this country was built;
namely, the concept of a Union supplanted with individual decla-
rations of liberty.1 8' A fundamental principle since the inception
of our government is that to live in the Union, individuals must
sacrifice certain individual rights to serve the good of the na-
tion."' The unique characteristic and beauty of the United
States is its composition of many people with differing view-
points. So long as such differences exist, views and personal
convictions will span the length of the spectrum. Though such
individuality and uniqueness are desired, they must not over-
shadow the central principles of the union. As Robert Bork
stated:' 3
Americans now place less value on what we owe others as a
matter of moral obligation; less value on sacrifice as a moral
good, on social conformity, respectability, and observing the
rules; less value on correctness and restraint in matters of
physical pleasure and sexuality-and correlatively greater value
on things like self-expression, individualism, self-realization,
and personal choice.8 4
The Court, in the view of many, has become notorious for
"failing to require individuals to take responsibility for their own
actions; failing to protect human values and to promote societal
'81 See infra note 182 and accompanying text; Richard A. Erb, Jr. & Alan W.
Mortensen, Wyoming Fetal Rights-Why the Abortion "Albatross" is a Bird of a Dif-
ferent Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 627, 652
("The idea that the United States Supreme Court alone can fairly legislate and ad-
judicate social policies violates traditional federalism. This violation manifests itself
in decisions such as Roe.") (footnote omitted).
182 See THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Ilt
is equally undeniable that whenever and however [the government] is instituted,
the people must cede to it some of their natural rights. .. ."). Some argue that the
barrage of individual freedoms sought by people of society today is out of control.
Furthermore, they revert back to the notions of early America that focused on relig-
ion as the regulating force of such "complete" individual freedoms. See Robert N.
Bellah, Religion and Legitimation in the American Republic, SOCIETY, Jan. 11, 1998,
at 199 (citing Tocqueville, who "saw religion as the great restraining element that
could turn naked self-interest into ... 'self-interest rightly understood,' that is, a
self-interest that was public spirited and capable of self-sacrifice").
182 Robert Bork was the Acting Attorney General for Richard Nixon during the
Saturday Night Massacre and was later a nominee for United States Supreme
Court. His nomination failed to obtain Congressional approval in 1987.
'8 BORK, supra note 157, at 65 (quoting William J. Bennett). This notion heark-
ens back to the inception of our present government and, particularly, to the first
Vice-President of the United States John Adams, who said that "[wie have no gov-
ernment armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled
by morality and religion." Bellah, supra note 182, at 193.
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responsibility; [and] failing to ... create a sense of coherence
among the conflicting interests involved."", The Court in Casey
correctly stated that
[olur Constitution is a covenant running from the first genera-
tion of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a
coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the
Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations that
must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility
not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant
in light of all our precedents. We invoke it once again to define
the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own promise, the
promise of liberty.
86
Although the Court acknowledged the necessity of ensuring the
Constitution's continuity, whose terms "must survive more ages
than one," "" it engaged in an about-face, manipulating its com-
mitment to the Constitution and conveniently disguising its
creation of a society of individuals in terms of liberty. The Casey
Court obliterated the communal foundations of our country,"s
opting instead for a country where each person is, so to speak,
the master of his own destiny with the opportunity to define his
own sense of reality.89 The Court proclaimed that "[a]t the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."9 '
Although this statement may have historic support at some
level,' 9' the Court created a "heretofore unheard-of constitutional
right to 'personal dignity and autonomy.' 192 The Court's decla-
ration thus completely defies the United States' republican form
of government.'93 Furthermore, the concept of "personhood," em-
1a SCHALLER, supra note 127, at 137 (alluding to the illuminations of Herzog's
character in The Sweet Hereafter). "When courts... [do not] reinforc[e the goals of
individual responsibility and societal well-being, they are incapable of serving either
truth or justice." Id.
'8 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (emphasis added).
187 Id.
"8 See supra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.
18 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
185 Id. at 851.
191 For such an example, see Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
(August 26, 1789), arts. 1, 4 and 5, translated in 10 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 71 (15th ed. 1985) and cited in SCALIA, supra note 10, at 134.
'9 BORIC, supra note 157, at 103.
'0 See Bellah, supra note 182, at 197 ("A republic as an active political commu-
nity of participating citizens must have a purpose and a set of values.... [and] must
attempt to be ethical in a positive sense and to elicit the political commitment of its
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bodying a great deal more than "individuality," demands an in-
tegrated sense of self within a greater social order. The Court's
decision in Casey reduces persons to the equivalent of isolated,
Cartesian beings.
The United States Supreme Court was intended to interpret
the Constitution based on sound legal reasoning and delibera-
tion, not to decide social and political policies."M The Supreme
Court, according to some, has superseded its constitutional
authority in that an issue as divisive as abortion should be left to
the democratic process vis a vis the constitutional amendment
process and individual state legislative initiatives.1 95 Because of
certain ideological blocs on the Court19 and the greater role that
the personal beliefs of individual justices97 have played in the
judicial appointment process in recent years, one is led to believe
that the judiciary is failing to fulfill its duties of deciding issues
narrowly, exercising self-restraint, and identifying and surpass-
ing its own biases.'98 This is evidenced by appointers having
greater concern about nominees' positions on salient issues than
with their overall jurisprudential approaches.
citizens."). The United States, though often referred to as a democracy, is indeed a
republican form of government-with votes cast for representative electors rather
than, for example, convening at the town square for a literal one person, one vote
poll.
194 See Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in
the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 306 (1993) (stating that courts have tradi-
tionally employed "reasoned judgment") (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992)).
..5 See id. at 307 ("Historically, the resolution of questions of a fundamentally
moral nature has been considered a state prerogative.... Thus, not only did Roe
preempt state moral prerogatives and... legislative decision making[,].. .[it] di-
min[ished] ... state and legislative authority."); Chuck Colson, The Human Life
Amendment (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http'J/www.breakpoint.orgscripts/60813.html>
("Passing a constitutional amendment would achieve a restoration of the democratic
process, for ratification will involve an extended, formal process by which the peo-
ple, not the courts, can decide the most divisive issue of our time. It could be a na-
tional referendum on the legal status of unborn children"). See generally supra note
181.
" See Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling the "Centrist Block"-An Empirical Analy-
sis of the Thesis of a Dominant, Moderate Block on the United States Supreme Court,
62 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (describing the cohesive voting of the ideological blocs
of the Supreme Court Justices).
197 See Erb & Mortensen, supra note 181, at 627 (describing the importance of a
Supreme Court nominee's position on abortion in the confirmation process).
"" See BORK, supra note 11, at 114, 220 (1990) (stating that the Roe decision is
merely an expression of the Court's own subjective views about the morality of
abortion).
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It is said that corporate characteristics parallel that of a
human being, including the ability to cause death, injury, dis-
ease, and severe physical pain,' to enter into agreements and
transactions, and to pay taxes.00 These attributes are not, how-
ever, those that come to mind as being the essence of
"personhood." A person is thought of as one who breathes,
grows, and develops. A person has facial attributes, a beating
heart, and physical processes. In addition, a person has sensory
perceptions, is endowed with reason, and experiences emo-
tions.20 ' However creative the legal fiction drawn, the corpora-
tion cannot be said to possess any of these traits.
From the moment of conception the fetus has living charac-
teristics. An embryo2 2 develops rapidly from the moment of its
creation2 6 and can suffer injury in as little as seventy-two hours
after conception. 2 4 By two weeks of development, differentiation
has begun, as cells begin to take on characteristics which enable
them to form specific organs, including the "nervous system
(including the brain), the skin and the hair... [, parts of] the
gastrointestinal tract, the liver, pancreas and thyroid... [as well
as] the skeleton, connective tissues, blood system, urogenital sys-
tem and most of the muscles."2" By the third week of fetal de-
velopment, the heart, as well as the brain, spinal cord, muscles,
and skeletal structure, have all started to develop, 2' as have the
0 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
201 In contrast, a corporation with its legally defined personhood, lacks such
characteristics. See FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that a corporation cannot suffer from emotional distress as it "lacks the cognizant
ability to experience emotions"); Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.
Supp.2d 146, 151 (D.P.R. 1998) (articulating the absence of a legal principle deline-
atinF corporate suffering of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
The term "embryo" generally refers to the developing child from the moment
of conception to ten weeks of development, after which it is called a fetus. See
GLADE B. CURTIS, YOUR PREGNANCY WEEK BY WEEK 95 (3rd ed. 1997). For the pur-
poses of this paper the two will be used interchangeably, as a legal distinction has
not been created between the terms "embryo" and "fetus" but, rather, between the
viable and unviable fetus. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1972).
203 See CURTIS, supra note 202, at 37 (explaining that the embryo is a group of
quickly developing cells).
"4 See id. at 52 (explaining that embryonic damage from the use of drugs during
pregnancy can lead to injury "as early as [three] days after conception").
Id. at 47 (explaining the development of the germ layers of cells which de-
velop into various bodily systems and organs).0" See i. at 54.
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fetus's eyes.0 7 At one month, the brain chambers, limb buds,0 8
and occasionally, the heartbeat 29 can be observed. At five weeks
of fetal development one finds progress in the brain and eyes,
and the presence and formation of the nostrils, intestines, pan-
creas, and the bronchi of the lungs.20 At six weeks, the tubes
that connect the throat and lungs are formed, arms and legs de-
velop further, and fingers and toes are visible.21' At seven weeks
the baby "looks more recognizable as a human being,"2 and is
capable of movement.2 3 At nine weeks of development, finger-
nails appear and the external genitals may begin to distinguish
gender.24  The fetus, at ten weeks old, possesses an audible
heartbeat. Likewise, most bones have started to form, digits
have separated, sex characteristics can be determined by observ-
able external genitalia, the digestive system can excrete and ab-
sorb substances, hormones are produced, insulin is secreted, and
there is fetal movement inside the uterus.215 Such movement is
definite, including squinting and the movement of the mouth,
fingers, and toes."6 By the time the fetus is eleven weeks old, its
body and face resemble that of a fully developed human. 21 7 At
the thirteenth week, ossification of the skeletal system occurs
and the fetus may be observed sucking its thumb.1 8
When the fetus is between four and five months old, it be-
gins activity and movement which can be felt by the mother, a
process referred to as "quickening."2 9 Approximately one month
later, the digestive system is developed enough to enable the fe-
tus to swallow, absorb needed materials, and pass unabsorbed
substances.20 Development continues, and at twenty-five weeks,
a little over six months of development, the eyelids will open and
207 See id. at 223.
208 See id. at 63.
209 See id. at 62.
210 See id. at 70.
211 See id. at 78.
212 Id. at 86.
213 See id. at 86 (noting that ultrasound technology can detect the movement of
the body and limbs).
214 See id. at 102.
210 See id. at 109, 193.
216 See id. at 110.
217 See id. at 117.
218 See id. at 131.
219 Id. at 138, 248 (referring to quickening as "the beginning of... bonding" and
as "miraculous").
220 See id. at 176.
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the baby will blink."2 Incidentally, twenty-five weeks of fetal de-
velopment marks the beginning of the third trimester.2
Unlike a corporation, a fetus may suffer bodily injury' and
death. The corporate parallels of injury or death-hostile take-
over and voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy-hardly parallel
the effects injury and death have on the human being. At the
embryonic stage a fetus may be harmed by environmental pol-
lutants and by medicinal and chemical factors which can lead to
lead poisoning, cerebral palsy, microcephaly, ambiguous genital
development, abnormalities of the bones, hands, reproductive or-
gans, and central nervous system, mental retardation, limb de-
fects, blindness, and possibly miscarriage.' The use of drugs
and alcohol likewise can have detrimental effects on the child's
health, including an increased chance of deformities and mis-
carriage.'
The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey2 26 rejected the
"rigid trimester framework,""' holding that no state has a right
to place an "undue burden" on a mother's right to obtain an
abortion prior to fetal viability.m Is this, however, a meaning-
less distinction? Legally, viability is the point at which a state
may "promot[e] its interest in the potentiality of human life" and
can regulate and proscribe abortions. 9 When one looks at the
physical reality of fetal viability, however, one sees that although
the mean s, that is, the trimester approach as compared to the fe-
tal viability approach, may have changed, the result has stayed
the same. The third trimester is marked at twenty-five weeks of
fetal development.2 Realistically, "[bletter methods of caring for
premature babies have contributed to higher survival statistics
[so that tioday, infants born as early as [twenty-five] weeks of
221 See id. at 225.
22 See id. at 222.
2' See Headley v. Ohio Gov't Risk Mgmt. Plan, No. CT97-0022, 1998 WL
346863, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1998) (Gwin, J., dissenting) (noting that a cor-
poration cannot suffer bodily injury).
24 See CURTIS, supra note 202, at 51, 90-91 (explaining that the fetus should be
protected from chemicals and pollutants to ensure healthy development).
2 See id. at 52 (emphasizing the deleterious effects of cocaine use on a child in
utero).
228 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
227 Id- at 878.
228 See id.
229 Id. at 879.
2o' See generally CURTIS, supra note 202, at 207-14.
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pregnancy can survive."" Earlier than that, however, fetal vi-
ability is less than promising. The premature birth survival rate
for a fetus weighing 1.1-1.5 pounds, 2 or in terms of time, at
twenty-two to twenty-three weeks of development, 3 is a mere
43%.' Can one realistically say that a fetus, which has grown
through to twenty-five weeks of development as outlined above,
cannot be deemed a "life?" The Court, though perhaps less
"rigid" in its rationale, seems to have created a distinction with-
out a difference and has in effect ordained that life begins at ap-
proximately twenty-five weeks of fetal development.
But is it for the Court to determine when life begins? Set-
ting aside the examination of viability and trimesters, the basic
truth is that fetal development parallels that of a human being.
Is one to say that the fetus is due less protection than a corpora-
tion because a corporation possesses more traits of "personhood"
than does the fetus? It is argued that:
[One] cannot... believe that a corporation which "can level
mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks and run railway
cars on them" is "a mere conception of the legislative mind," or
that it is a mere "artificial being invisible, intangible and exist-
ing only in contemplation of law," or that it is only an "invisible,
intangible essence of air."" 5
Can a life with a developing brain, functioning organs, mus-
cle, and skeletal structure seriously be denied at least as much
protection as corporations, rivers, and lakes? Does the corpora-
tion deserve greater protection than a fetus with a beating heart
simply due to its ability to "lay down iron tracks and run railway
cars on them?" This seems to be, at best, an absurdity.
The passage of laws purporting to protect fetuses by declar-
ing them "persons" is an accelerating national trend,"5 and not a
23' Id. at 240.
232 See id.
233See id. at 201, 207.
2" See id. at 240.
25WORMSER, supra note 16, at 7 (footnote omitted) (quoting New York Cent. &
Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)); see also Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727, 742-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("A ship has a legal per-
sonality, a fiction... [and tihe ordinary corporation is a 'person'... [s]o it should be
... [with] valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes... [and] air ..... ).
23 See Sam Orr, Equality is One Tough Equation, FLORIDA TODAY, June 26,
1998, available in 1998 WL 11940419 (discussing the Wisconsin law that recognized
a fetus as a person with a right to life).
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new phenomenon. Legal history27 is not completely devoid of the
idea that the moment of conception is the moment at which life
begins."s In fact, some courts have held that human life begins
at conception. A Tennessee appellate court in Davis v. Davis,2
9
although subsequently overruled,' ° believed the conundrum of
denying personhood protections to a fetus could not withstand
reason when it articulated that a healthy fetus is, indeed, a per-
son." I Though it hinges on viability, the Supreme Court has let
stand a 1997 South Carolina ruling which expands the definition
of "child" under child-neglect and child-abuse statutes to include
the unborn fetus. Following this trend of fetal protection,
South Dakota and Wisconsin have passed laws allowing a hus-
band, doctor, or guardian to request a court order that would
confine a pregnant woman abusing "alcohol or drugs."' These
laws not only allow the government to make demands on a preg-
nant woman, but also delegate that right to other "interested
23 See Donald Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1998, at 26
(explaining that, "a fetus is considered a person when its injuries give rise to a
criminal assault prosecution"); Herbert, supra note 168, at 12 (explaining recent
legislation signed into law by Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson defining the
"unborn child" as a human being from fertilization to birth). In the context of a sur-
vival statute, even a stillborn fetus has been considered a "person." See Wartell v.
Woman's and Children's Hosp., Inc., 676 So.2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 704
So.2d 778 (La. 1997).
2' See CNN Interactive, Roe v. Wade (visited June 22, 1999) <http//cnn.com/
SPECIALS/1998/roe.wadelaudio/index.html> (Texas Asst. Att'y. Gen. Robert Flow-
ers explaining that "[ilt is the position of the state of Texas that upon conception, we
have a human being...").
2' No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
240 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding that
"'[wlithout live birth, the Supreme Court has said, a fetus is not a 'person! ").
24' See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *9 (articulating the primary issue in the case
as "When does human life begin?").
242 See Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997) ("South
Carolina law has long recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding certain le-
gal rights and privileges."); see also Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 261 (1960)
(holding that denying a viable fetus personhood was "unsound and illogical" and
unjust); Regina M. Coady, Comment, Extending Child Abuse Protections to the Vi-
able Fetus: Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 682
(1997) (analyzing the Whitner decision and arguing that "[tihe child's physical loca-
tion is irrelevant.... [and that a] mother must not evade responsibility for abusing
her child at the child's most vulnerable stage, its fetal stage").
243 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70 (Michie 1986) (South Dakota's Title 34
Public Health and Safety Subchapter 34-20A "Treatment and Prevention of Alcohol
and Drug Abuse" statute); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.19 (West Supp. 1998) (Wisconsin's
Children's Code Subchapter "Holding a Child or an Expectant Mother in Custody").
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part[ies] ." 4 Arguably, constitutional rights should be personal
and the liberty of neither the mother nor the child in utero
should be determined based on the rights of another. Neverthe-
less, the trend toward protecting the fetus, unable to protect it-
self, is evident.
Again, is it for the courts to determine when life begins, or is
"life" a theological or medical designation? 5 The Court in Roe,
stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology... [are unable to] arrive at any con-
sensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
24A6knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Ironically, this is exactly what the Court did. Historically, until
Roe, the government of the United States had never limited nor
forced the meaning of life. "It is not recorded that any American
government, from the founding on, has ever thought it worth-
while to compel anyone's concept of meaning or of the mystery of
human life." 7 Yet the Court has in effect, proclaimed a begin-
ning of life and imposed it upon members of society.
VII. WHEN DOES LIFE BEGIN?
The questions of whether the fetus is a person and when
personhood begins are not new inquiries. Several theories of fe-
tal personhood have emerged. The chromosomal completion the-
ory is centered on the notion that from "the moment of fertiliza-
tion.., the creature... [which] has all the attributes of a
human from the beginning.., is not.., a 'potential life' 2S...
24 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.213 (West Supp. 1998) (allowing a court appointed legal
guardian to make the application for confinement).
245 See Douglas 0. Linder, The Other Right-To-Life Debate: When Does Four-
teenth Amendment "Life" End?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (1995) (querying
whether personhood should be defined biologically, philosophically, or religiously).
24 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
247 BORK, supra note 157, at 103.
248 See id. at 174-76; see also Mario Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Moral-
ity: A Catholic Governor's Perspective (Speech at the Univ. of Notre Dame, Sept. 13,
1984), in MORE THAN WORDS: THE SPEECHES OF MARIO CUOMO 37 (1993) ("[Ihe
whole community... should agree on the importance of protecting life-including
life in the womb, which is at the very least potentially human and should not be ex-
tinguished casually.") (emphasis added); id. at 42 ("A fetus is different from an ap-
pendix or a set of tonsils. At the very least.., the full potential of human life is in-
disputably there."); MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64 (positing that the cure for
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social evils "cannot be achieved by killing innocent victims who possess a full poten-
tial for... human life").
Other less compelling theories exist. The fetal consciousness theory is founded
on the belief that "it is doubtful that a fetus becomes conscious until well after the
time most abortions are performed, and even if he or she is conscious, that would
not put the fetus at a level of awareness comparable to that 'of a dog, let alone a
chimpanzee.'" BORK, supra note 157, at 178. One recognizes the inherent weakness
of this theory when looking at patients in persistent vegetative states [hereinafter
PVS]. There are many similarities between a fetus and a PVS patient. "PVS patients
continue to breathe, have blood pressure, react to light, and respond with merely
physical reflexes, such as grimacing or yawning." Linder, supra note 245, at 1184
(footnote omitted). Like the fetus, PVS patients have recently become the subject of
a new argument in the right to life debate, which has spiraled out of the fetal right
to life debate. See Linder, supra note 245, at 1183 (describing the recent trend in the
right to life debate and adding PVS patients among aborted fetuses as a subject of
the right to life controversy); see also BORK, supra note 157, at 176 (addressing
similarities between the fetus and the PVS patient). The underlying issue in the
PVS scenario is whether the state can justifiably terminate medical treatment-that
is, supporting or aiding the taking of a human life-irrespective of the PVS patient's
consent. See Linder, supra note 245, at 1183 (explaining the debate between those
who believe such state action is wrong and in violation of its authority and those
who believe that it is a "pragmatic choice" in a world of detached and reasoned con-
siderations of medical options).
Tangential issues in the PVS debate pit the value of ongoing medical care
against the value of life. See id. at 1186 (noting that exorbitant public health costs
are receiving increased scrutiny). But see id. at 1187 (suggesting an increase in the
number of PVS patients and the growing trend toward euthanasia may be providing
ammunition for the movement supporting the termination of the lives of PVS pa-
tients). Many of the same concerns voiced in the fetal abortion context are expressed
in the PVS context. See MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64 (drawing an analogy
between the aborting of a fetus and the killing of the terminally ill stating that "[ilf
the 'terminally' sick.., were put quietly to death, what a psychological relief for
those psychologically and materially responsible for their continued existence! But
what a horrible and totally unhuman perspective for society! [Ilt is quite frightening
to discover how close to its realization we already are.") (emphasis added). Since the
fetus is indeed a person, as is the PVS patient, it is argued that the fetus is entitled
to the same protections afforded a human being. See Johnsen, supra note 168, at
602. Likewise, fetuses should be afforded greater protections under the law due to
their complete inability to protect themselves. See CNN World News Briefs, Canada
bill bans sex selection, surrogate motherhood (visited June 22, 1999) <http:I/cnn.com/
WORLD/9606/14inewsbriefs/indeyhtml> (highlighting Canadian legislation in re-
sponse to certain genetic and reproductive practices and identifying them as
"'contrary to the principles of human dignity, respect for life, and protection of the
vulnerable' "). One of the more troubling illustrations of the particular need for fetal
protection was the discovery of 30 human fetuses in a dirt field in San Bernadino,
California. See CNN Interactive, Children find boxes containing human fetuses
(visited June 22, 1999) <http://cnn.comfUS/9703/15/briefs.pmlfetus>.
The anatomical viability theory, centered on the point at which the fetus' physi-
cal body can sustain its own life, completely ignores both fetal development up until
the point of viability as well as the theological and philosophical views of when life
begins. See Abortion and Fetal Viability, supra note 167. The Planned Parenthood
home page defines "fetal viability" as the point at which,
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[but] a life with potential." 9
This theory proposes that because a fetus is chromosomally
complete at the point of conception it is fully human from the
beginning.' ° Thus, it provides one of the strongest arguments in
support of the view that a fetus is a person from the moment of
conception. This parallels the Warnock Report on Human Fer-
tilization and Embryology published by the Warnock Commit-
tee.21 In its report, the committee enunciated that individual
human development begins at fourteen to fifteen days of fetal
growth. 2 As such, it is posited that the fetus inside the mother's
body should not be considered merely a "clump of tissues" 3 but
[the fetus] reaches an "anatomical threshold" when critical organs, such as
the lungs and kidneys, can sustain independent life. Until the air sacs are
mature enough to permit gases to pass into and out of the bloodstream,
which is extremely unlikely until at least 23 weeks gestation (from last
menstrual period), a fetus cannot be sustained even with a respirator,
which can force air into the lungs but cannot pass gas from the lungs into
the bloodstream.
Id. (quoting the collective amicus brief of the American Medical Association, Ameri-
can Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics,
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Fertility Society,
American Medical Women's Association, American Psychiatric Association, and
American Society of Human Genetics for Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
No. 88-605, at 7 (October Term 1998)).
249 BORK, supra note 157, at 175 (quoting Roe v. Wade language of "potential
life"). Bork explains that:
[T]he new organism is... a different individual. This cell produces specifi-
cally human proteins and enzymes from the beginning. Its chromosomes
will heavily influence its destiny until the day of its death, whether that
death is at the age of ninety or one month after conception.
The cell will multiply and develop, in accordance with its individual
chromosomes, and, when it enters the world, will be recognizably a human
baby. From single-cell fertilized egg to baby to teenager to adult to old age
to death is a single process of one individual.... It is impossible to draw a
line anywhere after the moment of fertilization and say that before this
point the creature is not human but after this point it is. It has all the at-
tributes of a human from the beginning, and those attributes were in the
forty-six chromosomes with which it began.... Such creature is not a blob
of tissue or... a "potential life"... [but rather] a life with potential.
Id. (emphasis added).
2' See id. at 174-76.
251 See MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE--THE WARNOCK REPORT ON
HUMAN FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1985).
212 See id. at 59 (holding that state regulation of embryonic research should be-
gin when the fetus reaches approximately two weeks). See Stenger, supra note 179,
at 144 (providing an overview of the Warnock Report).
253 Terry Gross, James McCartney on the 25th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade,
FRESH AIR, Jan. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2923510 (quoting Dr. James
McCartney, Chair of the Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, and Eth-
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rather as "the human form taking shape."'
"The moral debate over abortion centers on the point in the
development of the fertilized ovum when it has acquired those
characteristics that entitle it to moral respect." "u As stated ear-
lier, there is strong public sentiment for the proposition that life
begins at conception.1 6 The Warnock Committee recognized this
public sentiment as strong support for the view of the "absolute
sanctity" of life from the moment of conception. 7 Life, however,
has not always been deemed to begin at conception.' Histori-
cally, "[alt conception and the earliest stage of pregnancy before
quickening, no one believed that a human life existed; not even
the Catholic Church took this view129 The modern Christian
view of this issue, however, is that life begins at the moment of
conception. The Catholic Church teaches that, "lihiuman life
must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human
being must be recognized as having the rights of a person-among
which is the inviolable right of every innocent being to life."2'
Similarly, in the view of the Orthodox Christian churches, the
celebrations of the Feast of the Conception of St. John the Bap-
tist and the Feast of the Annunciation of Christ.. lend direct
support for the inherent belief that human life begins at concep-
tion rather than at the time of viability.2" Likewise, the Hebraic
prophecies in the Old Testament lend support to life beginning
prior to birth, as one finds in Jeremiah, "[blefore I formed you in
the womb I knew you, before you were born I dedicated you."2"
The ability to procreate has been described as "a God-like
privilege of man, which he has no right to refuse if he wants to
ics Consultant, Catholic East Health System).2Id&
2 BORK, supra note 157, at 176.
2s See id at 174; WARNOCK, supra note 251.
2 Stenger, supra note 179, at 142.
See LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE
AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-1973 8 (1997).
Mk (footnotes omitted).
260 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 547 § 2270 (1994) (emphasis added).
The official rules of the Catholic Church provide for excommunication as a penalty
for aborting a life in the mother's womb.
26' The Feast of the Annunciation of Christ is the celebration of the Conception
of Christ Himself, as Man, in the womb of the Virgin Mary. See MEYENDORFF, supra
note 163, at 64.
2G2 seei 
.2r Jeremiah 1:5.
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preserve the 'image and likeness of God' given him at his crea-
tion." ' "Indeed, for those who believe a fetus has a soul and is a
unique, irreplaceable object of God's affection and human re-
sponsibilities, it is hard to imagine how the fetus could not have
interests and rights commensurate with those responsibilities."2"
To that end, undoubtedly the aborting of a fetus is, in Biblical
tradition, "an interruption of human life."266 In light of the many
"persons" that have been afforded constitutional protection
throughout our history, it appears that fetal life should likewise
be granted those same rights and protections, as demonstrated
by traditional legal doctrine and various religious beliefs.
It is commonly argued that one must be born and alive to
qualify as a person."7 Yet the intent of our Constitution's fram-
ers regarding the definition of a "person" remains unclear. As-
suming, arguendo, that the framer's intended that only the living
receive constitutional protection, it appears that satisfying the
criterion of "living" may have been insufficient. Arguably, the
framers' intent was to include only the typical white male prop-
erty owner in their meaning of "person."268 Their intent to in-
clude blacks, women, and other minorities, who were considered
at the time less than equal to white property owning males, is
questionable, especially when general views on issues such as
slavery are considered."9 Today, the idea of non-whites being
264 MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 61.
26 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Review Essay, Beyond Dworkin's Dominions: In-
vestments, Memberships, the Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEM L. REV.
559, 589 (1994).
26 MEYENDORFF, supra note 163, at 64.
267 This ignores the legal fiction of the personhood of the corporation, which is
neither "born" nor "alive." See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
268 See Orr, supra note 236 ("The issue of personal freedom is very touchy, but
the Constitution is clear in this regard. It was written to permit a man to do pretty
much as he pleases, and I use the term man with foresight.") (emphasis added).
219 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 336 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining the general objection to including slaves in representation calcu-
lations was the notion that "[silaves are considered as property, not as persons...
[and should be] comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on prop-
erty, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of per-
sons"). Madison rejected the notion of slaves exclusively as property interests:
[One] must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property,
and in no respect whatever as persons.... [T]he slave may appear to be
degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals
which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on
the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all oth-
ers, [and in] his liberty... the slave is no less evidently regarded by the
538 [73:495
1999] FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT PERSONHOOD 539
denied personhood protections is inconceivable. But the history
of Supreme Court decisions has endorsed this notion, establish-
ing the real potential for such drastic consequences. In Dred
Scott v. Sanford,20 it was held that blacks were "beings of an in-
ferior order," and as such would be considered mere "ordinary
article[s] of merchandise and traffic."27' Thus, individuals who
clearly are born, alive, and human, were considered property
rather than persons.272
That type of decision is not unusual. Historically, the Court
has violated fundamental rights, as in Dred Scott. The effects of
the Dred Scott decision were dreadful. "[It took a civil war to
clean up the mess left by the Supreme Court... in Dred Scott."
273
Does this "public sentiment" that governed at that time in any
way justify or excuse the intolerable treatment of black slaves?
The obvious answer is "no." It is crucial to consider whether, in
another 150 years, we will awaken to discover that the current
treatment of the fetus is as appalling as was the treatment re-
ceived by black slaves, obviously persons, almost 150 years ago.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has deemed the corpora-
law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a
moral person, not as a mere article of property.
Id at 337. The general sentiment of the time nonetheless persisted, as Madison
classified slaves, in the same Federalist Paper, as both persons and property.
The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the
case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons
and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character be-
stowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied
that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext
that the laws have transformed the Negroes into subjects of property that
a place is disputed them in the... [census]; and it is admitted that if the
laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the Negroes
could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other
inhabitants.
Id-
270 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
271 I& at 407.
272 See Cabinet for Human Resources v. Women's Health Servs., Inc., 878
S.W.2d 806, 809 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (McDonald, J., concurring) (comparing the Roe
and Dred Scott decisions and stating that "eventually [Roe v. Wade] will be buried as
an atrocity and rightfully recognized as one of the most immoral laws of humankind,
comparable to the [Dred Scott] holding").
73 Roe v. Wade Anniversary Views, supra note 2.
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tion a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment and has af-
forded corporations great constitutional protections. The Court,
in delineating corporate rights and protections, has not based its
decisions upon the rights of others. Nevertheless, in the context
of fetal life, the Court has persistently balanced fetal rights
against the liberty interests of the mother. The determination of
one's rights must not be based on those of another. The afford-
ing of rights to a class of "persons" must be determined through
interpretation of the United States Constitution and the
amendments thereto.
Undeniably the Court has created and extended rights
where it has deemed appropriate, regardless of whether the ju-
diciary has assumed powers it was not originally intended to
have. This is perhaps the prime example of how the Court-
created legal fiction guarantees and creates rights for "persons"
to whom such rights otherwise would be unavailable. Likewise,
the Court must afford the fetus, whether through the employ-
ment of the legal fiction or the recognition of the fetus as a life
from the moment of conception, constitutional protection as a
"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Natasha N. Aljalian
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